SiblingsOfIlm Guest Contributionبسم الله الرحمن الرحيم، الحمد لله وحده، والصلاة والسلام على من لا نبي بعده،وعلى آله وأصحابه ومن نحا نحوه، أما بعد:
«ما تجوز به شهادة أهل الأهواء – (قال الشافعي – رحمه الله تعالى -): ذهب الناس من تأويل القرآن والأحاديث أو من ذهب منهم إلى أمور اختلفوا فيها فتباينوا فيها تباينا شديدا واستحل فيها بعضهم من بعض ما تطول حكايته وكان ذلك منهم متقادما منه ما كان في عهد السلف وبعدهم إلى اليوم، فلم نعلم أحدا من سلف هذه الأمة يقتدى به ولا من التابعين بعدهم رد شهادة أحد بتأويل وإن خطأه وضلله ورآه استحل فيه ما حرم عليه ولا رد شهادة أحد بشيء من التأويل كان له وجه يحتمله وإن بلغ فيه استحلال الدم والمال أو المفرط من القول وذلك أنا وجدنا الدماء أعظم ما يعصى الله تعالى بها بعد الشرك ووجدنا متأولين يستحلونها بوجوه وقد رغب لهم نظراؤهم عنها وخالفوهم فيها ولم يردوا شهادتهم بما رأوا من خلافهم فكل مستحل بتأويل من قول أو غيره فشهادته ماضية لا ترد من خطأ في تأويله وذلك أنه قد يستحل من خالفه الخطأ إلا أن يكون منهم من يعرف باستحلال شهادة الزور على الرجل لأنه يراه حلال الدم أو حلال المال فترد شهادته بالزور أو يكون منهم من يستحل أو يرى الشهادة للرجل إذا وثق به فيحلف له على حقه ويشهد له بالبت ولم يحضره ولم يسمعه فترد شهادته من قبل استحلاله الشهادة بالزور أو يكون منهم من يباين الرجل المخالف له مباينة العداوة له فترد شهادته من جهة العداوة فأي هذا كان فيهم أو في غيرهم ممن لا ينسب إلى هوى رددت شهادته وأيهم سلم من هذا أجزت شهادته وشهادة من يرى الكذب شركا بالله أو معصية له يوجب عليها النار أولى أن تطيب النفس عليها من شهادة من يخفف المأثم عليها».
The chapter regarding accepting testimony from the people of desires (Ahl al-ahwāʾ): (al-Shāfiʿī – Allāh Most High have mercy upon him – said[1]): “People have adopted different views in interpretations of the Qurʾān and Aḥādīth, or some of those from amongst them adopted views concerning matters in which they have differed and diverged greatly [in legal opinion], and some of them have deemed permissible things that would take long to relate. This has precedence from before them, from the era of the predecessors (salaf) and after them until today, yet we do not know of anyone from the predecessors of this ummah that are followed, nor those that followed after them (tābiʿīn), rejecting a person’s testimony due to an interpretive opinion (taʾwīl), even if they deem him erroneous or misguided[2], and believe him to have permitted in it that which has been forbidden. Nor did they reject the testimony of anyone due to an interpretive opinion that has a plausible basis, even if it leads to deeming lawful bloodshed, property or an extreme statement. This is because we have found bloodshed to be the most severe of deeds through which Allāh Most High is disobeyed after polytheism, yet we found people permitting it through interpretive legal opinion based on grounds that their peers disliked and opposed them therein, yet they still did not reject their testimony due to their disagreement with them. Therefore, the testimony of anyone deeming words or anything else as lawful through interpretive opinion will be passed and not rejected due to an error in his interpretation, because he may believe the one who is opposing him to be in error.
However, if someone from amongst them is known to deem false testimonies upon a person to be permissible because he believes his bloodshed or property to be permissible, then his testimony is rejected due to falsehood. Likewise, if someone from amongst them believes it is permissible to testify for a reliable person and take an oath for him [in a matter] concerning his rights, then decisively testifies for him despite not witnessing it nor hearing it[3], then his testimony is rejected due to him deeming false testimonies to be permissible. Similarly, if someone from among them has vehement animosity for his opponent, then his testimony is rejected due to enmity. So, whichever of these[4] is present amongst them or amongst others who are not associated with desire, I reject his testimony, and whomsoever from them is free from these qualities, I permit his testimony. The testimony of the one who deems lying to be [a form of] associating partners with Allāh, or a sin through which the hellfire would become binding upon him[5], is more acceptable than the testimony of the one who deems it a light sin.
«وكذلك إذا كانوا مما يشتم قوما على وجه تأويل في شتمهم لا على وجه العداوة وذلك أنا إذا أجزنا شهادتهم على استحلال الدماء كانت شهادتهم بشتم الرجال أولى أن لا ترد لأنه متأول في الوجهين والشتم أخف من القتل فأما من يشتم على العصبية أو العداوة لنفسه أو على ادعائه أن يكون مشتوما مكافئا بالشتم فهذه العداوة لنفسه وكل هؤلاء ترد شهادته عمن شتمه على العداوة. وأما الرجل من أهل الفقه يسأل عن الرجل من أهل الحديث فيقول كفوا عن حديثه ولا تقبلوا حديثه لأنه يغلط أو يحدث بما لم يسمع، وليست بينه وبين الرجل عداوة فليس هذا من الأذى الذي يكون به القائل لهذا فيه مجروحا عنه لو شهد بهذا عليه إلا أن يعرف بعداوة له فترد بالعداوة لا بهذا القول، وكذلك إن قال إنه لا يبصر الفتيا ولا يعرفها فليس هذا بعداوة ولا غيبة إذا كان يقوله لمن يخاف أن يتبعه فيخطئ باتباعه وهذا من معاني الشهادات وهو لو شهد عليه بأعظم من هذا لم يكن هذا غيبة إنما الغيبة أن يؤذيه بالأمر لا بشهادته لأحد يأخذ به منه حقا في حد ولا قصاص ولا عقوبة ولا مال ولا حد لله ولا مثل ما وصفت من أن يكون جاهلا بعيوبه فينصحه في أن لا يغتر به في دينه إذا أخذ عنه من دينه من لا يبصره فهذا كله معاني الشهادات التي لا تعد غيبة»
Likewise[6], if they are from those who curse a certain group due to interpretive juristic grounds and not out of hatred, because if we accept their testimony despite them permitting bloodshed, then their testimony despite cursing people is more deserving of not being rejected, because they are doing it based on juristic interpretation in both cases, but to curse is less serious than murder. As for those who curse out of fanaticism, personal animosity or claiming that he was cursed[7] and is thus retaliating with curse, then this is personal enmity. The testimony of all these people concerning the one they cursed out of personal enmity, is rejected.
As for a person from amongst the jurists that is asked regarding a person from the traditionalists[8] and says: “Refrain from his ḥadīth” and “Do not accept his ḥadīth” due to him making errors or narrating that which he has not heard, and there is no animosity between him and the person, then this is not an insult through which the one saying it is criticised, if he witnessed this from him, except if he is known to have enmity towards him, in which case he is rejected due to enmity, not due to these statements[9]. Similarly, if he says: “He does not possess insight in issuing legal opinions (futyā)” or “He does not understand it[10]” then this is not from animosity or backbiting if he is saying it to one whom he fears will follow him and err in his following. This is extracted from the legal principles of testimonies, which is that if he was to testify against him with something greater than that, it would not constitute backbiting, because backbiting is only that he insults him by a statement, not by giving testimony through which someone will obtain their right from him in regard to capital punishment, retribution, punishment, wealth, a punishment of Allāh or anything else similar to what I have described when a person is unaware of another’s defects, so he advises him in order to prevent him from being misled through him in regards to his religion if he takes his religion from someone who does not understand it. All of this falls within the realms of testimonies that are not regarded as backbiting.
»(قال): والمستحل لنكاح المتعة والمفتي بها والعامل بها ممن لا ترد شهادته، وكذلك لو كان موسرا فنكح أمة مستحلا لنكاحها مسلمة أو مشركة، لأنا نجد من مفتي الناس وأعلامهم من يستحل هذا وهكذا المستحل الدينار بالدينارين والدرهم بالدرهمين يدا بيد والعامل به لأنا نجد من أعلام الناس من يفتي به ويعمل به ويرويه، وكذلك المستحل لإتيان النساء في أدبارهن فهذا كله عندنا مكروه محرم وإن خالفنا الناس فيه فرغبنا عن قولهم ولم يدعنا هذا إلى أن نجرحهم ونقول لهم إنكم حللتم ما حرم الله وأخطأتم لأنهم يدعون علينا الخطأ كما ندعيه عليهم وينسبون من قال قولنا إلى أنه حرم ما أحل الله عز وجل«.
He said[11]: “The one that believes the marriage of mutʿah[12] to be permissible, the one who passes a legal verdict upon its permissibility and the one who does it, are all from those whose testimony will not be rejected. Likewise[13], the wealthy man that marries a slave-girl believing his marrying her to be lawful[14], irrespective of whether she is a believer or a polytheist, because we have found from the peoples jurists and their eminent scholars those who deemed it to be permissible, and similarly the one who believes the hand-to-hand exchange of one dīnār for two dīnārs or one dirham for two dirhams to be lawful[15], as well as the one who does it, because we have found amongst the distinguished scholars who issued legal verdicts those that have permitted it, practiced it and transmitted it. The same applies for the one that holds anal intercourse to be lawful[16], for all of these acts according to us are repugnant and prohibited, and even if people oppose us in it, and we detest their view, it has not led us to disparage them[17] and say to them: “Indeed, you have permitted that which Allāh has prohibited, and you have erred”, for they claim us to be on error just as we claim them to be on error, and they attribute to those that adopt our view that they have forbidden that which Allāh Mighty and Exalted has made lawful.”[18]
[1] The book al-Umm is transmitted by Imām al-Shāfiʿīs student, Abū Muḥammad al-Rabīʿ bin Sulaymān al-Murādī (d. 270 AH), who was well-known for transmitting the knowledge and books of Imām al-Shāfiʿī, see: [al-Dhahabī, Siyar Aʿlām al-Nubalāʾ, 12:587-591]. He is not to be confused with Abū Muḥammad al-Rabīʿ bin Sulaymān al-Azdī (d. 256 AH), who was a contemporary of al-Murādī that was also a student of al-Shāfiʿī, and shared a few notable students with al-Murādī such as Imām al-Ṭaḥāwī (d.321 AH), Imām al-Nasāʾī (d.303 AH) and Imām Abū Dāwūd (d.275 AH), see: [ibid, 12:591-592]
[2] i.e. in this legal opinion of his which is a result of juristic interpretation
[3] i.e. he did not witness the incident in any meaningful way yet is testifying for this person solely because he believes he is a trustworthy person. This is also false testimony (shahādah al-zūr).
[4] i.e. if the qualities of enmity and permitting false testimonies are found in anyone, Imām al-Shāfiʿī would reject their testimony.
[5] This is likely a reference to the Khawārij, a deviant sect that believed whoever commits a major sin (of which lying is one of them) exits the fold of Islām. To a lesser degree, it could also refer to the Muʿtazilah, another deviant sect that believed whoever commits a major sin will be in ‘the level between two levels’ (al-manzilah bayn al-manzilatayn) referring to the persons īmān being suspended on repentance, such that if he died without repenting from the major sin, he would spend eternity in the hellfire.
[6] i.e. their testimony will be accepted
[7] i.e. he was cursed initially by the other person
[8] i.e. muḥaddithūn/ahl al-ḥadīth
[9] For further details on the permissibility of narrator critique and its limits, see: [ʿAbd al-Ḥayy al-Lucknawī, al-Rafʿ wa al-Takmīl fī al-Jarḥ wa al-Taʿdīl (Beirūt, Dār al-Bashāʾir al-Islāmiyyah), p.52-78]
[10] i.e. how to issue a legal opinion
[11] Referring to Imām al-Shāfiʿī
[12] A temporary marriage that has a set, conditioned time limit to it. Virtually all Sunni Muslims deem this type of marriage abrogated and therefore unlawful, however, some Rawāfiḍ still permit it. Imām Aḥmad (d.241 AH) and others have also attributed it to an unnamed group of early Meccans, see: [Ibn al-Mundhir, al-Awṣaṭ min al-Sunan wa al-Ijmāʿ wa al-Ikhtilāf, (Egypt, Dār al-Falāḥ), 8:417-422], [ʿAbdullāh bin Aḥmad, Masāʾil al-Imām Aḥmad (Beirūt, al-Maktab al-Islāmī), p.449] [Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, al-Istidhkār (Beirūt, Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah), 5:506]
[13] i.e. the testimony of the following people will not be rejected either.
[14] This is the view of Imām al-Shāfiʿī and other early jurists, that marrying a slave-woman is only permissible if one does not have the means to marry a free woman. Some jurists permitted the marriage even if the man is wealthy, which is also the position of the Ḥanafī Madhhab, see: [al-Marwazī, Ikhtilāf al-ʿUlamā (Riyāḍ, Aḍwāʾ al-Salaf), p. 235], [Muḥammad bin al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī, al-Aṣl (Beirūt, Dār Ibn Ḥazm), 10:263-264], [al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Aḥkām al-Qurʾān (Bierūt, Dār Iḥyāʾ Turāth al-ʿArabī), 3:109-119]
[15] The vast majority of scholars hold this to be impermissible and a form of ribā, such that some believed there to be no disagreement on this, barring a group of unnamed Meccans that were attributed to have followed the view of permissibility originally held by ʿAbdullāh Ibn ʿAbbās (d.68 AH), though he later retracted this view, see: [Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, al-Istidhkār, 6:351-355]
[16] Anal intercourse was deemed impermissible by the overwhelming majority of scholars. Though there are some differing reports surrounding the view of ʿAbdullah bin ʿUmar (d.73 AH), Nāfiʿ (d.117 AH) and Imām Mālik (d.179 AH) on the matter, most have denied this and deemed that the most authentically attributed view of theirs is also prohibition. There are reports from a few scholars living within this early period, such as Maʿmar bin Rāshid (d.153 AH) and al-Awzāʿī (d.157 AH), where they acknowledge that this was an infamous isolated view of the Medinans, though there are some defects in the chain of transmission for these reports (see: Al-Amr bi al-Maʿrūf wa al-Nahy ʿan al-Munkar by al-Khallāl (Beirūt, Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah), p.66, and al-Sunan al-Kubrā of al-Bayhaqī: 20919). Nevertheless, Imām al-Shāfiʿī himself elsewhere in al-Umm (5:186) explicitly states that “our companions have differed in the ruling of having anal intercourse with women, some of them adopted the view of its permissibility”, and this difference of opinion is corroborated by the earliest writers in jurisprudential differences (fiqh al-khilāf) like al-Ṭabarī (d.310 AH), Ibn al-Mundhir (d.318 AH) and al-Ṭaḥāwī (d.321 AH). So, with all of that in mind, it is very difficult to suggest that this view had no precedent at all amongst the early generations, see: [Ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Ikhtilāf al-Fuqahāʾ (Beirūt, Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah), p.304-305], [Ibn al-Mudhir, al-Awṣaṭ, 9:121-123], [al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Mukhtaṣar Ikhtilāf al-ʿUlamāʾ li al-Ṭaḥāwī (Beirūt, Dār al-Bashāʾir al-Islāmiyyah), 2: 343-345], [al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 1:426-428]
[17] From this, two points are understood; (1) A person holding an interpretive juristic view, cannot be deemed a fāsiq (open sinner), because if he was a fāsiq, his testimony would be rejected. (2) The importance of respecting a person’s genuine efforts in valid scholarship, even if one disagrees with the conclusion.
[18] This is a very crucial point, because many are under the impression that a prohibitive view inherently holds more weight than a permissive one, when the strength of both is only judged by their evidence. Neither one can hold more intrinsic weight, because a person claiming either one is speaking regarding the religion of Allāh Most High, which is a grave matter in any case. This can be noted in verse of the Qurʾān (16:116), where Allāh Most High equally berates those that falsely declare things lawful and unlawful.
Translated and annotated by: Mawlana Adam Ayub
Any errors in representation or translation are the translators’ own, and not attributable to the author. We welcome any constructive feedback, critiques or further suggestions via email.
Disclaimer: The writer does not endorse any of the isolated views mentioned within this article. Rather, the purpose here is to highlight Imām al-Shāfiʿīs approach to juristic disagreement, even when the opinion in question is an extremely fringe view that the overwhelming majority of scholars strongly reject.
Siddiqa Saidzada
